We construct a simple fully homomorphic encryption scheme, using only elementary modular arithmetic. We use Gentry's technique to construct fully homomorphic scheme from a "bootstrappable" somewhat homomorphic scheme. However, instead of using ideal lattices over a polynomial ring, our bootstrappable encryption scheme merely uses addition and multiplication over the integers. The main appeal of our scheme is the conceptual simplicity.
are chosen from the same prescribed intervals as above. Then to encrypt a bit m, the ciphertext is essentially set as m plus a subset sum of the x i 's.
We reduce the security of this scheme to approximate integer gcd -roughly, that it is hard to recover p from the x i 's. This problem, for the case of two x i 's, was analyzed by HowgraveGraham [HG01] . Our parameters -in particular, the large size of the q i 's -are designed to avoid a generalized version of his attack (as well as other attack avenues, such as solving the associated simultaneous Diophantine approximation problem).
We comment that our scheme is similar to Regev's first encryption scheme [Reg04] . In fact, a slight variation of Regev's scheme can be described by exactly the same formula as ours, Enc(m, p) = qp + 2r + m. The main difference between the schemes is that in order to get the homomorphic properties, our choice of parameters is much more aggressive than his. Another difference is that the secret key p in our scheme is an integer, whereas in Regev's scheme the secret key is chosen as an integral fraction of the domain size (i.e., p = N/h for some integer h). Unfortunately, Regev's worst-to-average-case security reductions from [Reg04] do not seem to apply to our scheme.
Preliminaries

Notation
Below we usually denote parameters by Greek letters (e.g., η, γ, τ , etc.), with λ always denoting the security parameter. Real numbers and integers are denoted by lowercase English letters (p, q, x, y, etc.).
For a real number z, we denote by z , z , z the rounding of a up, down, or to the nearest integer. Namely, these are the unique integers in the half open intervals [z, z + 1), (z − 1, z], and (z − All logarithms in the text are base-2 unless stated otherwise.
Probability Background
A family H of hash functions from X to Y , both finite sets, is said to be 2-universal if for all distinct x, x ∈ X, Pr h Then, (h, h(x) ) is mod 2. (Considering only bit operations also means that the plaintext space of the encryption schemes that we consider is limited to {0, 1}.) See the works of Ishai and Paskin [IP07] for a more general definitional treatment of homomorphic encryption with respect to other forms of "programs."
A homomorphic public key encryption scheme E has four algorithms: the usual KeyGen, Encrypt, and Decrypt, and an additional algorithm Evaluate. The algorithm Evaluate takes as input a public key pk, a circuit C, a tuple of ciphertexts c = c 1 , . . . , c t (one for every input bit of C), and outputs another ciphertext c. Definition 2.2 (Correct Homomorphic Decryption). The scheme E = (KeyGen, Encrypt, Decrypt, Evaluate) is correct for a given t-input circuit C if, for any key-pair (sk, pk) output by KeyGen(λ), any t plaintext bits m 1 , . . . , m t , and any ciphertexts c = c 1 , . . . , c t with c i ← Encrypt E (pk, m i ), it is the case that:
Decrypt (sk, Evaluate(pk, C, c)) = C(m 1 , . . . , m t ) Definition 2.3 (Homomorphic Encryption). The scheme E = (KeyGen, Encrypt, Decrypt, Evaluate) is homomorphic for a class C of circuits 1 if it is correct for all circuits C ∈ C. E is fully homomorphic if it is correct for all boolean circuits.
The semantic security of a homomorphic encryption scheme is defined in the usual way [GM84] , without reference to the Evaluate algorithm. (Indeed Evaluate is a public algorithm with no secrets.)
It is clear that as defined above, fully homomorphic encryption can be trivially realized from any secure encryption scheme, by an algorithm Evaluate that simply attaches a description of the circuit C to the ciphertext tuple, and a Decrypt procedure that first decrypts all the ciphertexts and then evaluates C on the corresponding plaintext bits. Two properties of homomorphic encryption that rule out this trivial solution are circuit-privacy and compactness.
Circuit privacy roughly means that the ciphertext generated by Evaluate does not reveal anything about the circuit that it evaluates beyond the output value of that circuit, even for someone who knows the secret key. We discuss circuit privacy in Appendix C. It is folklore that circuitprivate fully-homomorphic encryption can be realized using Yao's "garbled circuits" [Yao82, LP09] and a two-flow oblivious transfer protocol. (This construction is similar to the trivial solution from above, essentially it replaces the plaintext circuit with a garbled circuit.) Hence the "real challenge" in constructing fully homomorphic encryption comes from the compactness property, which essentially means that the size of the ciphertext that Evaluate generates does not depend on the size of the circuit C.
Definition 2.4 (Compact Homomorphic Encryption). The scheme E = (KeyGen, Encrypt, Decrypt, Evaluate) is compact if there exists a fixed polynomial bound b(λ) so that for any key-pair (sk, pk) output by KeyGen(λ), any circuit C and any sequence of ciphertext c = c 1 , . . . , c t that was generated with respect to pk, the size of the ciphertext Evaluate(pk, C, c) is not more than b(λ) bits (independently of the size of C).
Bootstrappable Encryption
Following Gentry [Gen09b] , we construct homomorphic encryption for circuits of any depth from one that is capable of evaluating just a little more than its own decryption circuit.
Definition 2.5 (Augmented Decryption Circuits). Let E = (KeyGen, Encrypt, Decrypt, Evaluate) be an encryption scheme, where decryption is implemented by a circuit that depends only on the security parameter. 2 For a given value of the security parameter λ, the set of augmented decryption circuits consists of two circuits, both take as input a secret key and two ciphertexts: One circuit decrypts both ciphertexts and adds the resulting plaintext bits mod 2, the other decrypts both ciphertexts and multiplies the resulting plaintext bits mod 2. We denote this set by D E (λ).
Definition 2.6 (Bootstrappable Encryption). Let E = (KeyGen, Encrypt, Decrypt, Evaluate) be a homomorphic encryption scheme, and for every value of the security parameter λ let C E (λ) be a set of circuits with respect to which E is correct. We say that E is bootstrappable if D E (λ) ⊆ C E (λ) holds for every λ. We also note that if the bootstrappable scheme E is "circular secure" then it can be converted into a single compact fully-homomorphic encryption scheme E . See [Gen09b] for details.
A Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption Scheme
Parameters. The construction below has many parameters, controlling things like the number of integers in the public key and the bit-length of the various components. Specifically, we use the following four parameters (all polynomial in the security parameter λ): γ is the bit-length of the integers in the public key, η is the bit-length of the secret key (which is the hidden approximate-gcd of all the public-key integers), ρ is the bit-length of the noise (i.e., the distance between the public key elements and the nearest multiples of the secret key), and τ is the number of integers in the public key.
These parameters must be set under the following constraints:
• ρ = ω(log λ), to protect against brute-force attacks on the noise;
The definition of the set C E from above is rather indirect. In particular this definition does not give a good picture of what C E "looks like". By the triangle inequality, a k-fan-in Add gate clearly increases the magnitude of the integers by at most a factor of k. However, a 2-fan-in Mult gate may square the magnitude of the integers -i.e., double their bit-lengths. So, clearly, the main bottleneck is the multiplicative depth of the circuit, or the degree of the multivariate polynomial computed by the circuit. We have the following lemma.
Lemma 3.4. Consider a multivariate polynomial f (x 1 , . . . , x t ) of degree d and let C be an arith-
Proof. Obvious.
Since we only consider binary circuits then the polynomials in question have 0-1 coefficients, so | f | is just the number of nonzero terms in f , which cannot be more than t d for a degree-d polynomial on t variables. The condition of Lemma 3.4 is therefore ensured as long as
Below we refer to binary polynomials that satisfy Equation (1) as permitted polynomials and we denote by P E the set of permitted polynomials and by C(P E ) the set of circuits that compute them. The discussion above implies that
Remark 3.5. For our purposes, we consider settings where ρ = ω(log λ) and t, τ ≤ λ β , and we need to support polynomials of degree upto αλ log 2 λ (for some constants α, β). Plugging these expressions in Equation (1), it is sufficient to set η ≥ αλ log 2 λ(ρ + 3 + 2β log λ) + 4 = ρ · Θ(λ log 2 λ).
An Optimization
Below we describe one possible avenue for reducing the bandwidth and computational complexity of this scheme. Note that while Encrypt reduces the ciphertext modulo the public key element x 0 , we cannot do the same in Evaluate. The reason is that after just one multiplication the ciphertext becomes much larger than x 0 , so modular reduction will include a large multiple of x 0 hence introducing intolerable error.
To reduce the ciphertext size during Evaluate, we can add to the public key more elements of the form x i = q i p + 2r i where the r i 's are chosen as usual from the interval (−2 ρ , 2 ρ ) but the q i 's are chosen much larger than for the other public key elements. Specifically, for i = 0, . . . γ, we set:
During Evaluate, every time we have a ciphertext that grows beyond 2 γ , we reduce it first modulo x γ , then modulo x γ−1 , and so on all the way down to x 0 , at which point we again have a ciphertext of bit-length no more than γ.
Recall that a single operation at most doubles the bit-length of the ciphertext. Hence after any one operation the ciphertext cannot be larger than 2x γ , and therefore the sequence of modular reductions involves only small multiples of the x i 's, which means that it only adds a small amount of noise. (We note that in addition to smaller ciphertexts, this optimization also reduces the public key size when we use the "decryption squashing" technique as described in Section 6.1.)
It is not clear to what extent adding these larger integers to the public key influences the security of the scheme. On one hand it seems to change the hardness assumption that we need to make, but on the other hand the reduction from Section 4 still goes through if we change the underlying approximate-gcd problem and allow the solver to also get samples with large quotients. 3 Finally, we note that having integers with these very large quotients does not seem to help in any of the attacks that we consider.
Remark 3.6. Note than when using the original scheme without the optimization, homomorphic evaluation of different circuits that compute the same polynomial would result in the exact same output ciphertext (i.e., the polynomial applied to the input ciphertexts over the integers). This is no longer true when using the size-reduction optimization, because of the eadditional modular reduction steps. For example, evaluating the circuit "x 1 (x 2 + x 3 )" is likely to yield a different ciphertext than the circuit "x 1 x 2 + x 1 x 3 ."
In principle, it is plausible that evaluating one circuit would yield a ciphertext with small enough noise to be decrypted, while evaluating another circuit for the same polynomial will produce a ciphertext with too much noise. Adapting the "bootstrappability analysis" from Section 6.2 to the optimized scheme, one would have to take into account not only the degree of the polynomial implementing the decryption process but also the particular circuit that implements this polynomial. It should not be hard to argue that the circuit in Section 6.2 does not introduce too much noise, but the analysis is quite tedious and is omitted here.
Security of the Somewhat Homomorphic Scheme
We reduce the security of the scheme from Section 3 to the hardness of the approximate-gcd problem. Namely, given a set of integers x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x τ , all randomly chosen close to multiples of a large integer p, find this "common near divisor" p.
On a high level, our reduction resembles classical hard-core-bit proofs in factoring-based cryptography (e.g., Alexi et al. [ACGS88] ): Fixing a randomly-chosen public key, we roughly show that an adversary who can predict the encrypted bit in a random ciphertext under this public key can be used to find the secret key (for this fixed public key). As in [ACGS88] , we describe a random-self-reduction and accuracy-amplification step that uses the promised adversary to get a reliable oracle for the least-significant bit, and then a binary-GCD algorithm that uses that reliable oracle to find p.
The technical details, of course, are very different than in factoring-based cryptography. Perhaps the main difference is that our random self-reduction entails a loss in parameters. Specifically, we show that the ability to guess the encrypted bit in a random "high noise ciphertext" can be converted into the ability to predict the parity bit of the quotient in an arbitrary "low noise integer". (Roughly, the reason for this is that we need to add extra noise to "wipe out the traces" of the non-random noise in the arbitrary input integer.)
The implication is that we can only reduce the security of our cryptosystem in the "high-noise regime" to the hardness of approximate-gcd in the "low-noise regime." However, the difference between "high noise" and "low noise" is rather small: we have ρ-bit noise for the public-key elements in the scheme and (ρ − ω(log λ))-bit noise for the approximate-gcd problem.
Reduction to Approximate-GCD
The problem of approximate-gcd is parameterized by three parameters: The bit-length of the integers involved (γ), the bit-length of the approximate common divisor (η), and the bit-length of the noise (ρ). For a specific (η-bit) odd positive integer p, we consider the following distribution over γ-bit integers: Proof Recall that we use q p (z) and r p (z) to denote the quotient and remainder of z with respect to p,
Let A be an attacker against the scheme. Namely, A takes as input a public key and a ciphertext (as produced by KeyGen and Encrypt of our scheme), and outputs the correct plaintext bit with probability 1 2 + for some noticeable . (The probability is over KeyGen and Encrypt, as well as the choice of the plaintext bit and the internal randomness of A.)
We use A to construct a solver B for approximate-gcd with parameters ρ , η, γ. For a randomly chosen η-bit odd integer p, the solver B has access to as many samples from D γ,ρ (p) as it needs, and the goal is to find p.
Step 1: creating a public key. The solver B begins by constructing a public key for the scheme. Note the differences between the public key elements and integers drawn from D γ,ρ (p): the public key elements have larger noise, which is always even. In principle we would like to draw elements x i $ ← D γ,ρ (p) and just double them, but this will make the quotient q p (2x i ) always even. Thus what we do is use [2x i ] x 0 (plus some added noise), and "hope" that the quotient q p (x 0 ) is odd.
In more details, B draws τ + 1 samples w 0 , . . . , w τ $ ← D γ,ρ (p) and checks that the largest one is an odd integer. Else it draws again until this condition is satisfied. Then B relabels the w i 's so that w 0 is the largest one. We observe that if q p (w 0 ) happens to be odd, then r p (w 0 ) must be even (since both w 0 and p are odd).
In Lemma 4.3 we show that if q p (w 0 ) happens to be odd then the distribution induced on the public key is statistically close to that of the scheme.
Step 2: A subroutine for high-accuracy LSB predictor. Next, B produces a sequence of integers, and attempts to recover p by utilizing A to learn the least-significant bit of the quotients of these integers with respect to p. For this, B uses the following subroutine:
6. Output the majority vote among the b j 's.
In Lemma 4.4 we show that for all but a negligible fraction of the public keys generated by the scheme, the "ciphertext" c j in line 3 is distributed almost identically to a valid encryption of the bit
It follows that if A has a noticeable advantage in guessing the encrypted bit under pk (and the conditions in Lemma 4.4 are met), then Learn-LSB(z, pk) will return [q p (z)] 2 with overwhelming probability.
Step 3: Binary GCD. Once we turned A into an oracle for the least-significant-bit of q p (z), recovering p is rather straightforward. Perhaps the simplest way of doing it is using the binary GCD algorithm [Knu97] : Given any two integers
, repeatedly apply the following process to them:
2. Use the oracle to learn the parity bit of both q p (z 1 ) and
3. If both q p (z i ) are odd then replace z 1 by z 1 ← z 1 − z 2 and set b 1 ← 0.
For each z i with
Observe that when p r p (z i ), subtracting the parity bit does not change the quotient with respect to p, only the remainder. That is, q p (z i − parity(z i )) = q p (z i ). It follows that when we set z i ← (z i − parity(z i ))/2 in line 4 (where we know that q p (z i ) is even), we get
We now show that the noise in z 1 , z 2 never grows too large in this process. Clearly, setting
Moreover, when we replace z 1 by z 1 ← z 1 − z 2 in line 3 and then by z 1 ← (z 1 − parity(z 1 ))/2 in line 4, we have
Hence the r p (z i )'s never grow beyond the largest of the initial two, so we always have p r p (z i ). This implies that the operations above correspond to the usual operations of the binary GCD algorithm, applied to the q p (z i )'s. Hence after O(γ) iterations we will finally get two integers z 1 , z 2 with z 2 = 0 and q p (z 1 ) being the odd part of GCD(q p (z 1 ), q p (z 2 )) (for the two initial integers).
Step 4: Recovering p. To recover p, the solver B draws a pair of elements z * 1 , z * 2 $ ← D γ,ρ (p) and applies the binary-GCD algorithm to them. With probability at least π 2 /6 ≈ 0.6, the odd part of GCD(q p (z * 1 ), q p (z * 2 )) is one, which means that the procedure will output an elementz = 1 · p + r with |r| ≤ 2 ρ . (If this does not happen then B draws two new integers and tries again.)
Lastly B repeats the binary-GCD procedure from above using z 1 = z * 1 and z 2 =z, and the sequence of parity bits of the q p (z 1 )'s in all the iterations spell out the binary representation of
Summary. We have shown that B can recover p given access to a reliable oracle for computing [q p (z)] 2 (for z's with noise much smaller than p). It is left to analyze the probability (over B's choice of public key) with which the procedure Learn-LSB(z, pk) from above is indeed such a reliable oracle.
The Success Probability of B
Below we prove two technical lemmas about the distribution of public keys and ciphertexts in our scheme. In Lemma 4.3 we prove that conditioned on some probability-1 2 event, the distribution of the public key that B generates is negligibly close to the correct distribution from the scheme. Let us denote this probability-1 2 "good event" by G. Then, in Lemma 4.4 we prove that for every secret key p and for all but a negligible fraction of the public keys (as generated by KeyGen for the secret key p), the procedure that B uses to generate ciphertexts in line 3 of the subroutine Learn-LSB produces a distribution which is statistically close to the ciphertext distribution of the scheme.
Putting these two lemmas together lets us analyze the success probability of B. Let P be the set of odd integers in [2 η−1 , 2 η ) for which A has more than ε/2 advantage
A counting argument shows that the fraction of odd integers from [2 η−1 , 2 η ) that are in P is at least ε/2. For a given p ∈ P, we similarly denote by PK p the set of public keys for which A has advantage at least ε/4:
Again, for every p ∈ P, the KeyGen algorithm (when using the secret key sk = p) must output pk ∈ PK p with probability at least ε/4. Consider now a single run of B when it is given access to D γ,ρ (p) for some p ∈ P. With probability 1/2 the "good event" G happens, in which case the public key that B produces is negligibly close to the right distribution. Hence conditioned on G, B generates some pk ∈ PK p with probability ε ≥ ε/4 − negl. Moreover, by Lemma 4.4, with probability ε − negl not only is the public key in PK p , but also the ciphertext-generation that B uses in line 3 of Learn-LSB "works" for this public key (meaning that the ciphertexts that it generates are chosen from almost the right distribution). If that happens then A returns the right answer in line 4 of Learn-LSB with probability ε/4−negl. As that subroutine calls A for poly(λ)/ε times and takes majority vote, it will return the right answer with overwhelming probability, and B will recover the approximate-gcd p.
Thus, when the hidden secret is p ∈ P then B has probability at least 1/2 · (ε/4 − negl) of recovering it in a single run. Repeating the algorithm B for (8/ ) · ω(log λ) times will therefore recover such p's with overwhelming probability. Hence we have a solver of complexity poly(λ, 1/ε) that works with overwhelming probability for every p ∈ P, so the overall success probability of this solver is at least the density of P, which is at least ε/2. This completes the proof of Theorem 4.2. 
Proof. (sketch)
It remains to show that the r p (x i ) have almost the correct distribution, regardless of what the q p (x i )'s are. This follows because we add to each of them independent noise of the same size as in the public key distribution, which has magnitude larger (in terms of bit-length) by a factor ω(log λ) than the remainder that they would have otherwise, thus statistically drowning out the original remainder. 
Then with overwhelming probability (over the choice of (sk, pk)), every distribution C pk (x * ) is statistically close to to the distribution Encrypt(pk, m = [x * ] 2 ) (up to a negligible statistical distance).
Proof. (sketch) Writing c = q p + 2r + m, again the argument boils to separate arguments that q and r are distributed as in the scheme.
Regarding q , we claim that in the scheme the value q p (c) of a ciphertext is uniform in (−q 0 /2, q 0 /2] by the leftover hash lemma; since the summation used to generate c is as in the scheme, this implies that the value q is also uniform in (−q 0 /2, q 0 /2]. This claim follows from Lemma 4.5 below. To apply the lemma meaningfully -i.e., to ensure that the distribution is negligibly within uniformwe need τ > log q 0 + ω(log λ), as indicated in our parameter choices.
Regarding r , the intuition is that (a) the part that comes from the subset-sum is identical to the scheme, and (b) the part that comes from r * + r is statistically close to the scheme, since the random r is distributed as in the scheme and is much larger than r * . Unfortunately part (a) of this intuition (and in fact even the lemma statement above) is not quite true. This is because the addition of x * may mean that the reduction mod x 0 subtracts a different multiple of x 0 than the one that would be subtracted without x * (and therefore the noise component r 0 appears in the modular-subset-sum with a different multiple).
Perhaps the simplest way of fixing this problem is to choose r $ ← [−2 ρ+ω(log λ) , 2 ρ+ω(log λ) ] for the ciphertext in both the scheme and the reduction. If we do not want to change the scheme, we can instead make a small change in the reduction: Namely, the procedure Learn-LSB would get not only z and the public key pk, but also the integers w 0 and r 0 that B used to generate x 0 . Then it would compute the multiples of x 0 that are used in the reduction modulo x 0 with and without x * , and subtract the appropriate multiple of r 0 from the ciphertext. Specifically, if the reduction modulo x 0 implies a multiple t · x 0 when x * is present and t · x 0 when it is not, then the ciphertext will be computed as c ← x * + 2r + i∈S x i x 0 − (t − t)r 0 . This way, the only differences in the noise components between c and the ciphertext that would be generated by the scheme come from x * and w 0 , both of which have noise with bit-length ρ = ρ − ω(log λ), which is negligible relative to the ρ-bit noise that comes from r. 
Proof. Define a family H of hash functions from {0, 1} T to Z M as follows. The members h ∈ H are associated to elements (
This family is clearly 2-universal. Therefore, by the leftover hash lemma (Lemma 2.1), (h, h(x)) is
Note that Lemma 4.5 means in particular that for all but a 4 2 T /M fraction of the choices of x 1 , . . . , x T , the induced distribution over x T +1 is at most 4 2 T /M away from uniform.
Remark 4.6. We point out that the reduction above (and therefore our scheme) can work with distributions other than the uniform for the q i 's and r i 's. For the r i 's, all we need is that the distribution is "smooth enough" so that taking any fixed number x and adding to it noise r with variance x 2 yields a distribution that is almost identical to the distribution of r itself. (In particular we can use a Gaussian distribution for the r i 's, as is done in Regev's scheme [Reg04] .)
For the q i 's all we need is that the distribution has high enough entropy to use the leftover hash lemma.
Known Attacks
Consider the approximate-gcd instance {x 0 , . . . , x t } where x i = pq i + r i . In this section, we first review known attacks on the approximate-gcd problem for two numbers (i.e., when t = 1) -including brute-forcing the remainders, continued fractions, and Howgrave-Graham's approximate gcd algorithm [HG01] . Later, we consider attacks for arbitrarily large values of t -including lattice-based algorithms for simultaneous Diophantine approximation [Lag82] , Nguyen and Stern's orthogonal lattice [NSt01] , and extensions of Coppersmith's method to multivariate polynomials [Cop97] .
The Approximate GCD of Two Numbers
A simple brute-force attack is to try to guess r 1 and r 2 , and verify the guess with a gcd computation. Specifically, for r 1 , r 2 ∈ (−2 ρ , 2 ρ ), set
If p has η bits, output p as a possible solution. The solution p will definitely be found by this technique, and for our parameter choices, where ρ is much smaller than η, the solution is likely to be unique. The running time of the attack is approximately 2 2ρ .
A variant of the brute-force attack is to set x 1 as above, factor x 1 , and, if there is an η-bit factor p , see whether p is an approximate divisor of x 2 . Since in our parameters γ is substantially greater than η, the attack should use a factoring algorithm whose performance depends primarily on the size of the target factor rather than the size of the entire number being factored. For example, Lenstra's elliptic curve factoring algorithm [Len87] runs in time roughly exp(O( √ η)) (with only polynomial dependence on γ), thus resulting in overall attack complexity ≈ 2 ρ+ √ η .
Continued fractions seem like a natural way to recover p from x 1 and x 2 . Using continued fractions, one obtains a sequence of integer pairs (
Moreover, every pair (s, t) such that |x 1 /x 2 − s/t| < 1/2t 2 is in the sequence. Since q 1 /q 2 is a good approximation of x 1 /x 2 , one may hope that it occurs as a pair in the sequence; if so, one recovers p = x 1 /q 1 . However, in our scheme, |x 1 /x 2 − q 1 /q 2 | is not small enough to be recovered using continued fractions. Specifically, we have
where (q 2 r 1 − q 1 r 2 )/p in the final term is likely to be much larger than 1. To describe the failure of continued fractions another way, the mere fact that an approximant a i /b i is close to x 1 /x 2 does not mean that there exist r 1 , r 2 p such that x 1 = pa i + r 1 and x 2 = pb i + r 2 -i.e., the continued fractions method is not constrained to output the kind of approximants that we need. See [HG01] for a more detailed exposition of the continued fractions approach to approximate-gcd.
Howgrave-Graham [HG01] also gives a lattice attack on the two-element approximate-gcd problem that is related to Coppersmith's celebrated algorithm for finding small solutions to univariate and bivariate modular equations [Cop97] . For the case where x 1 is exactly divisible by p, where his algorithm performs slightly better, the attack recovers p when ρ/γ is smaller than (η/γ) 2 . The algorithm does not degrade gracefully for ρ, η, γ that do not satisfy the constraint. Rather, in this case, the relevant lattice may contain exponentially vectors unrelated to the approximate-gcd solution, so that lattice reduction yields nothing useful.
The Approximate GCD of Many Numbers
Now, let us consider attacks -specifically, lattice attacks -for arbitrary t. First, note that the rational numbers y i = x i /x 0 are an instance of the simultaneous Diophantine approximation (SDA) problem: indeed for all i it holds that
, where |s i | ≈ 2 ρ−η . We can therefore try to use Lagarias' algorithm for SDA [Lag82] , namely apply LLL to the (t+1)-dimensional lattice L spanned by the rows of the following matrix:
Our target solution corresponds to a vector of length roughly 2 γ+ρ−η √ t + 1 -specifically,
where the first entry in v satisfies |q 0 2 ρ | < 2 γ−η+ρ and all the other entries satisfy |x 0 q 0 (
However, the target solution is not necessarily the shortest nonzero vector in the lattice, and therefore is not necessarily discovered by lattice reduction. In particular, Minkowski tells us that L has a nonzero vector of length at most det(
. This is shorter than our target solution when t + 1 < γ/η. In fact, heuristically, L will tend to have exponentially (in t) many vectors of length poly(t) det(L) 1/(t+1) , which obscure our target solution. 4 On the other hand, when t is large, v likely is the shortest vector in L, but known lattice reductions algorithms will not be able to find it efficiently. Specifically, as a rule of thumb, they require time roughly 2 t/k to output a 2 k approximation of the shortest vector. Since clearly there are exponentially (in t) many vectors in L of length at most x 0 √ t + 1 < 2 γ √ t + 1, which is about 2 η−ρ times longer than v, we need better than a 2 η−ρ approximation. For t ≥ γ/η, the time needed to guarantee a 2 η approximation (which is not even good enough to recover v) is roughly 2 γ/η 2 . Thus setting γ/η 2 = ω(log λ) foils this attack.
We continue the discussion of known attacks in Appendix B. The remaining attacks that we discuss perform no better than those above, against all of which our scheme has at least 2 λ security.
Making the Scheme Fully Homomorphic
We follow Gentry's approach [Gen09b] for constructing a fully homomorphic encryption scheme from a somewhat homomorphic scheme E that is bootstrappable as per Definition 2.6. For reasons similar to those in Gentry's construction from [Gen09b] , computing the decryption equation m ← [c − c/p ] 2 seems to require boolean circuits that are deeper (by a constant factor) than what our somewhat homomorphic scheme can handle. Hence we use Gentry's transformation to "squash the decryption circuit." In this transformation, we add to the public key some extra information about the secret key, and use this extra information to "post process" the ciphertext. The post-processed ciphertext can be decrypted more efficiently than the original ciphertext, thus making the scheme bootstrappable. We pay for this saving by having a larger ciphertext, and also by introducing another hardness assumption (basically assuming that the extra information in the public key does not help an attacker break the scheme).
Squashing the Decryption Circuit
Let κ, θ, Θ be three more parameters, which are functions of λ. Concretely, below we use κ = γη/ρ, θ = λ, and Θ = ω(κ·log λ). 5 For a secret key sk * = p and public key pk * from the original somewhat homomorphic scheme E * , we add to the public key a set y = {y 1 , . . . , y Θ } of rational numbers in [0, 2) with κ bits of precision, such that there is a sparse subset S ⊂ {1, . . . , Θ} of size θ with i∈S y i ≈ 1/p (mod 2). We also replace the secret key by the indicator vector of the subset S. In more details, we modify the encryption scheme from Section 3 as follows:
KeyGen. Generate sk * = p and pk * as before. Set x p ← 2 κ /p , choose at random a Θ-bit vector with Hamming weight θ, s = s 1 , . . . , s Θ , and let S = {i : s i = 1}.
Choose at random integers u i ∈ Z ∩ [0, 2 κ+1 ), i = 1, . . . , Θ, subject to the condition that i∈S u i = x p (mod 2 κ+1 ). Set y i = u i /2 κ and y = {y 1 , . . . , y Θ }. Hence each y i is a positive number smaller than two, with κ bits of precision after the binary point. Also,
Output the secret key sk = s and public key pk = (pk * , y).
Encrypt and Evaluate. Generate a ciphertext c * as before (i.e., an integer). Then for i ∈ {1, . . . , Θ}, set
, keeping only n = log θ + 3 bits of precision after the binary point for each z i . Output both c * and z = z 1 , . . . , z Θ .
Recall that we defined a permitted polynomial (on t variables) as one with 0-1 coefficients and degree d satisfying d < η−4 ρ+logt+log τ +3 (cf. Equation (1)). We proved that our somewhat homomorphic scheme was correct for the set C(P E ) of circuit that compute permitted polynomials, and we now show that this is true also of the modified scheme.
Lemma 6.1. The modified scheme from above is correct for C(P E ). Moreover, for every ciphertext (c * , z) that is generated by evaluating a permitted polynomial, it holds that
s i z i is within 1/4 of an integer.
Proof. Fix public and secret keys, generated with respect to security parameter λ, with {y i } Θ i=1 the rational numbers in the public key and {s i } Θ i=1 the secret-key bits. Recall that the y i 's were chosen so that
Fix a permitted polynomial P (x 1 , . . . , x t ) ∈ P E , an arithmetic circuit C that computes P , and t ciphertexts {c i } t i=1 that encrypt the inputs to C, and denote c * = Evaluate(pk, C, c 1 , . . . , c t ). We need to establish that
where the z i 's are computed as [c * · y i ] 2 with only log θ + 3 bits of precision after the binary point,
Recall that the output ciphertext c * is obtained by evaluating the polynomial P on the input ciphertexts c i (as if P was an integer polynomial). Since the c i 's are all smaller than 2 γ and the polynomial P has 0-1 coefficients and degree d, it follows that the integer c * cannot be larger in absolute value than t d · (2 γ ) d . Using the fact that P is a permitted polynomial (cf. inequality ( ) below), we can bound the bit-size of c * by In other words, E is bootstrappable. The proof is similar to Gentry's [Gen09a, Gen09b] . By Theorem 2.7, we obtain homomorphic encryption schemes for circuits of any depth.
Proof. The goal is to express the modified decryption equation
as a permitted polynomial (i.e., one satisfying Equation (1)), and show that there is a polynomialsize circuit that computes this polynomial. Recall that c * is an integer, the sk i 's are bits, and the z i 's are rational numbers in [0, 2), in binary representation with n = log θ + 3 bits of precision after the binary point. Also, our parameter setting implies two promises -namely, that sk i · z i is within 1/4 of an integer, and that only θ of the bits sk 1 , . . . , sk Θ are nonzero.
We split the computation up into three steps:
., a i = z i when sk i = 1 and a i = 0 otherwise). The a i 's are still rational numbers in [0, 2), given in binary representation with n bits of precision after the binary point.
From the Θ rational numbers {a
, generate other n + 1 rational numbers {w j } n j=0 , each with less than n bits of precision, such that j w j = i a i (mod 2).
3. Output c * − ( j w j ) mod 2.
The first step can be performed with a 1-level sub-circuit of multiplication gates. However, the second and third steps require more complicated sub-circuits.
The problem of using a shallow boolean circuit to compute the sum k i=1 r i of k rational numbers in binary representation is well-studied. A well-known technique uses the three-for-two trick (see a i is a i,0 • a i,−1 a i,−2 . . . a i,−n . The integer W −j is the Hamming weight of the column of bits (a 1,−j , a 2,−j , . . . , a Θ,−j ).
[KR88]), whereby a constant-depth circuit is used to transform three numbers of arbitrary bit-length into two numbers that are at most 1 bit longer, such that the sum of the two output numbers is the same as the sum of the three input numbers. (The output bits of the constant-depth circuit are linear or quadratic expressions with 3 monomials in the input bits.) By applying this trick at most log 3/2 k +2 times, one obtains two numbers s 1 and s 2 such that s 1 +s 2 = k i=1 r i . Hence the total depth that it takes to reduce k numbers to two numbers is d ≤ 2 log 3/2 k +2 < 8k 1/ log(3/2) < 8k 1.71 . The depth of the circuit needed to compute the final sum of two numbers is logarithmic in their bit-lengths, but if we are only interested in s 1 + s 2 mod 2 and have the promise that s 1 + s 2 is within 1/4 of an integer, this value can be computed by multivariate polynomial of degree 4 (and only nine terms). Overall, the circuit for computing k i=1 r i mod 2 corresponds to a polynomial of degree at most d ≤ 32k 1/ log(3/2) . Unfortunately, this degree (with k = Θ) is still too large for our scheme to handle. Hence we use Gentry's technique from [Gen09a] that takes advantage of the fact that all but θ of the a i 's are zero.
Let us denote the bit representation of each rational number a i by a i,0
The heart of this procedure is a subroutine for computing integers W −j , j = 0, 1, . . . , n, where W −j is the Hamming weight of the "column" of bits (a 1,−j , a 2,−j , . . . , a Θ,−j ) (see an illustration in Figure 1 ). Since at most θ of the a i 's are nonzero, then the W −j 's are no larger than θ, and hence can be represented by log(θ + 1) < n bits. By Lemma 6.3 below, every bit in the binary representation of W −j can be expressed as a polynomial of degree at most 2θ in the Θ variables a i,−j , i = 1, 2, . . . , Θ. Moreover all of these polynomials can be computed simultaneously by an arithmetic circuit of size O(θ · Θ).
Once we have the W −j 's, the sum of the a i 's can be obtained by i a i = j 2 −j W −j . For j = 0, 1, . . . , n we set w j = (2 −j ·W −j ) mod 2, so the w j 's are rational numbers with log(θ + 1) < n bits of precision. We can now sum-up the w j 's using the three-for-two trick as above, this this time with k = n + 1, thus obtaining the sum of the a i 's mod 2.
We conclude that the degree of the polynomials in the first step is two, the degree of polynomials in the second step is at most 2θ, and the degree of the polynomial in the third step is at most 32(n + 1) 1/ log(3/2) < 32 log θ + 4 1.71 < 32 log 2 θ Therefore the total degree of the decryption circuit is bounded by 2 · 2θ · 32 log 2 θ = 128θ log 2 θ, and since we are using θ = λ we have degree at most 128λ log 2 λ. It follows that the augmented decryption circuits D E (i.e., decryption followed by a single multiplication or addition, cf. Definition 2.5) can be expressed as polynomials of degree at most 256λ log 2 λ in the Θ variables sk i . Since Θ = ηγ ρ · ω(log λ) < λ 7 (and also τ < λ 7 ) the argument in Remark 3.5 at the end of Section 3.2 (with α = 256 and β = 7) indicates that we can get D E ⊂ C(P E ), making the scheme bootstrappable, by setting η ≥ 256λ log 2 λ(ρ + 3 + 14 log λ) + 4 = ρ · Θ(λ log 2 λ).
It is left to show how to compute the W j 's using polynomials of degree no larger than 2θ. 
Clearly, the degree of e 2 i is exactly 2 i .
As for the "Moreover" part, we can compute the elementary symmetric polynomials in the σ i 's as the coefficients of the polynomial P σ (z) = t i=1 (z −σ i ) in the auxiliary formal variable z, with e k ( σ) being the coefficient of z t−k . Conveniently, to compute only the first few bits W 0 , W 1 , . . . , W i , we can simply discard every term that has degree larger than 2 i while computing P σ (z). For example, one "dynamic programming" procedure for computing W 0 , W 1 , . . . , W i (which can be trivially made into a circuit) would go as follows:
Input: bits σ 1 , . . . , σ t 0. Initialization: Set P 0,0 ← 1 and P j,0 ← 0 for j = 1, 2, 3, . . . ,
Remark 6.4. Observe that a circuit implementation of the procedure from above is not "shallow", indeed it has depth 2t. Nonetheless, since it computes only "low degree polynomials" (i.e., upto degree 2 i ), then by Lemma 3.4 it is a permitted circuit. Intuitively, when computing this circuit homomorphically, the error term is kept manageable because all the multiplication gates involve input ciphertexts (encrypting the σ k 's), and these have very low error. (Alternatively, one can "rebalance" the circuit, getting a circuit of depth O(log t) that still computes the same polynomials.)
Security of the Squashed Scheme
Putting the hint y in the public key induces another computational assumption, related to the sparse subset sum problem (SSSP) used by Gentry [Gen09a] , and studied previously (sometimes under the name "low-weight" knapsack) in the context of server-aided cryptography [NSh01] and in connection to the Chor-Rivest cryptosystem [NS05] . We can easily avoid known attacks on the problem by choosing θ large enough to avoid brute-force attacks (and improvements using timespace trade-offs) and choosing Θ to be larger than ω(log λ) times the bit-length of the rational numbers in the public key (which have length κ).
A Proof of Correctness
Proof. (Lemma3.2] We first consider a "fresh" ciphertext output by Encrypt. The following lemma says that each such ciphertext is close to a multiple of p, and that its difference from the closest multiple of p has the same parity as m. Proof. By definition, c ← m + 2r + i∈S x i x 0 . Since |x 0 | ≥ |x i | for i ∈ {1, . . . , τ }, we have that
For every i, there exist integers q i and r i with |r i | ≤ 2 ρ such that x i = q i · p + 2r i , and also |r i | ≤ 2 ρ . We have
Regarding the rightmost term, its parity is the same as m, and its absolute value is at most (4τ + 3)2 ρ < τ 2 ρ+3 , as claimed.
The following lemma says that essentially the same is true for ciphertexts output by Evaluatei.e., ciphertexts are close to multiples of p, though possibly not as close. (pk, C, c 1 , . . . , c t ) . Then, c = a · p + (2b + m) for some integers a and b with |2b + m| < p/8.
Proof. Let C be the generalized circuit corresponding to C, which operates over the integers rather than modulo 2. Generally, we have that 
where q = (q 0 , . . . , q t ) and r = (r 0 , . . . , r t ). Therefore, any vector that is orthogonal to both q and r -i.e., is in the lattice 
q, r , and including this dimension increases the determinant by a factor of det( To recover vectors in L ⊥ q, r using lattice reduction, the attacker needs the shortest nonzero vector in L ⊥ x \ L ⊥ q, r to be longer than an independent set of vectors in L ⊥ q, r . This occurs roughly when
On the other hand, when t > γ/(η − ρ) is large, lattice reduction algorithms will not be able to recover the short vectors in L ⊥ q, r efficiently. Similar to the analysis of the SDA attack, we need our lattice reduction algorithm to provide at least a 2 η−ρ approximation to obtain vectors guaranteed to be in L ⊥ q, r , and (for such large t) known lattice reduction algorithms take time roughly 2 γ/η 2 to guarantee such a close approximation.
A very similar attack is the following. Consider the lattice spanned by the rows of the following t × (t + 1) matrix, where row i corresponds to the constraint x i − r i = 0 (mod p), and R i is an upper bound on |r i |.
. . . The determinant of this lattice is bounded by the product of the norms of the columns of M , namely at most √ tXR t , where X is an upper bound on |x i |. Hence it has vectors roughly as short as R t √ X. To obtain suitable vectors v, we need this quantity to be at most p. We obtain R t √ X < p when t > γ/(η − ρ). The rest of the analysis is similar to that for the previous attack.
B.2 Extending Coppersmith's Method
We may attempt to use Coppersmith's technique [Cop97] to augment the last attack from above. Namely, instead of looking only at the relations x i − r i = 0 (mod p), we can also look at their products, e.g. (x i − r i ) 2 = 0 mod p 2 , (x i − r i )(x j − r j ) = 0 mod p 2 , etc. As an illustrative example, consider the case of products of up to two relations from a total of t = 3 available relations. We then have a matrix whose rows correspond to the t+1 2 = 6 possible pairs of relations, and whose columns correspond to the t+2 2 = 10 terms that appear in these product relations: is equal to zero modulo p 2 . If in addition the l 1 norm of this vector is smaller than p 2 , then it must be the case that the polynomial evaluates to zero over the reals. If we can find t such small vectors (corresponding to independent polynomials) then we can use resultants to eliminate all but one of the variables, and then find the roots of the last polynomial, which would give one of the r i 's (and therefore also p and all the other r i 's).
To get an estimate on the length of the vectors that we can expect to find, we again need to estimate the determinant of the lattice. We note that in each of the columns, all the non-zero entries are likely roughly the same size (up to polynomial factor in t). Hence if we use elementary row operations to put this matrix in row-echelon form, then the coefficients of these elementary operations would probably all be polynomially small The determinant can now be estimated as roughly equal to the product of the row-lengths, and estimating the row-length using the size of the pivot we get
Since the lattice L(M ) has dimension T = t+1 2 , we expect to be able to find vectors in it of size about 2 εT · T det(M ) ≈ 2 εt(t+1)/2 · (R(X (t+2)/(t+1) /R) 1/t ) 2 , which is p 2 for t ≤ (γ − ρ)/(η − ρ). The rest of the analysis is similar to that for the previous attacks. (Note that here we actually do worse with products of pairs of relations than we did with the individual relations, in that the size of the vector that we expect grew from 2 O(t 3/2 ) to 2 O(t 2 ) .) these solutions apply only to the "honest-but-curious" case, where the public key is generated as it should by the KeyGen procedure. We did not look into the problem of hiding the circuit in the presence of a maliciously-generated public key.
